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Unifying Leakage Models: from Probing Attacks to Noisy Leakage

http://www.firstlight.cn2016/1/26

[作者] Alexandre Duc Stefan Dziembowski Sebastian Faust

[单位] University of Warsaw

[摘要] A recent trend in cryptography is to formally show the leakage resilience of cryptographic implementations in a given leakage model. One of the most prominent leakage models – the so-called bounded leakage mo…

[关键词] foundations Leakage resilience

A recent trend in cryptography is to formally show the leakage resilience of cryptographic

implementations in a given leakage model. One of the most prominent leakage models –

the so-called bounded leakage model – assumes that the amount of leakage is a-priori bounded.

Unfortunately, it has been pointed out that the assumption of bounded leakages is hard to verify

in practice. A more realistic assumption is to assume that leakages are sufficiently noisy, following

the engineering observation that real-world physical leakages are inherently noisy. While the

noisy leakage assumption has first been studied in the seminal work of Chari et al. (CRYPTO

99), the recent work of Prouff and Rivain (Eurocrypt 2013) provides the first analysis of a full

masking scheme under a physically motivated noise model. In particular, the authors show that

a block-cipher implementation that uses an additive masking scheme is secure against noisy leakages.

Unfortunately, the security analysis of Prouff and Rivain has three important shortcomings:

(1) it requires leak-free gates, (2) it considers a restricted adversarial model (random message

attacks), and (3) the security proof has limited application for cryptographic settings. In this

work, we provide an alternative security proof in the same noisy model that overcomes these

three challenges. We achieve this goal by a new reduction from noisy leakage to the important

theoretical model of probing adversaries (Ishai et al – CRYPTO 2003). Our work can be viewed

as a next step of closing the gap between theory and practice in leakage resilient cryptography:

while our security proofs heavily rely on concepts of theoretical cryptography, we solve problems

in practically motivated leakage models.

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原文发布时间:2016/1/26

引用本文:

Alexandre Duc;Stefan Dziembowski;Sebastian Faust.Unifying Leakage Models: from Probing Attacks to Noisy Leakagehttp://ynufe.firstlight.cn/View.aspx?infoid=3600931&cb=Z09890000000
发布时间:2016/1/26.检索时间:2024/12/16

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